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Abstract—The main goal of this study is to design a market
operator (MO) and a distribution network operator (DNO) for a
network of microgrids in consideration of multiple objectives.
This is a high-level design and only those microgrids with
nondispatchable renewable energy sources are considered. For a
power grid in the network, the net value derived from providing
power to the network must be maximized. For a microgrid, it
is desirable to maximize the net gain derived from consuming
the received power. Finally, for an independent system operator,
stored energy levels at microgrids must be maintained as close
as possible to storage capacity to secure network emergency
operation. To achieve these objectives, a multiobjective approach
is proposed: the price signal generated by the MO and power
distributed by the DNO are assigned based on a Pareto optimal
solution of a multiobjective optimization problem. By using the
proposed approach, a fair scheme that does not advantage one
particular objective can be attained. Simulations are provided to
validate the proposed methodology.
Index Terms—Distribution network operator (DNO), mar-
ket operator (MO), microgrids, multiobjective approach, multi-
microgrid design, Pareto optimality, smart grid, utility maximiza-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic pricing in the smart grid is an approach that
helps reshape or reduce the power demands by varying the
cost of power service over time. Power consumers who are
sensitive to the energy price may change their power use in
response to the varying price signals [1]. Dynamic pricing has
been extensively discussed and explored in the literature [2]–
[15]. For instance, a pricing scheme can be used as an area
control method [2]–[5] or a home-scale method [6] for energy
management. A grid node may store energy in a local energy
storage system when the price is low, and use the stored energy
when the price increases [7]. When shiftable loads are involved
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in the grid, power users may vary their power demands
according to the price [8], [9]. This further indicates that the
pricing scheme is capable of lowering the peak load [10] so
that the maximum system capacity and thus the cost can be
reduced.
For a successful application of dynamic pricing, elements
such as active participation of consumers in demand re-
sponse [16], robust energy management [17], [18], and proper
power distribution [19] are needed in the smart grid. To
include these elements for further investigation on the grid,
we consider a network of microgrids, an independent system
operator (ISO) that consists of a market operator (MO) and a
distribution network operator (DNO), and a power grid [20].
In the network, microgrids are locally connected with non-
dispatchable renewable energy sources (RESs) [21], and some
of them possess energy storage systems.
The microgrids take advantage of the power supply from the
power grid, RESs, and their local energy storage systems to
meet their respective power demand. The MO generates a price
signal that is related to the power supply, power demand and
stored energy in the network. The DNO distributes the power
generated at the power grid to microgrids. The MO and DNO
in the ISO are positioned at the highest control level in the
multi-microgrid environment, which allows these two entities
to have a substantial impact on the grid operation.
To facilitate ensuing discussions, we refer to the network
and the participants of the network as the multi-microgrid
system. Furthermore, we refer to determining the price signal
generated by the MO and the power distribution performed
by the DNO as a high-level design of the multi-microgrid
system, i.e., the multi-microgrid system design includes both
an electricity market design and a power distribution design.
In the multi-microgrid system, the power grid and microgrids
desire their respective asset utilization to be optimized, and
the ISO desires that the multi-microgrid system should store as
much energy as possible to secure emergency operation. From
this perspective, an optimal multi-microgrid system design
leads to optimizing interests of the microgrids, power grid,
and ISO simultaneously. This suggests the consideration of a
multiobjective optimization problem (MOP).
In contrast, most existing approaches related to high-level
grid system designs consider solely utility maximization by
maximizing certain aggregate benefits, sometimes termed the
social welfare [22]. For instance, the associated aggregate
function can be a sum of all utility functions of microgrids
minus the cost of power generation at the power grid [23], [24].
These formulations lead to a single-objective optimization
problem (SOP). Market price generation, power distribution,
2or efficient energy consumption can then be characterized as
the solution to the SOP.
Although able to produce a reasonable design, existing
approaches can suffer from at least one of the following
drawbacks. First, optimizing a system performance index
related to emergency operation is often neglected. Maximizing
the aggregate utility of the power grid and microgrids is
the only objective that must be attained. Second, the mutual
relationship between the utility maximization of the power
grid and of the microgrids is seldom addressed. Third, system
operation schemes resulting from maximizing the aggregate
function may favor a particular participant [25]–[28]1, e.g.,
the power grid or microgrids, depending on the weighting
coefficients used in the aggregate function and on the con-
flicting relationship among objectives of participants. In a fair
and transparent setting joined by active participants, this bias
should be generally avoided.
To address these drawbacks, we propose a multiobjective
approach to multi-microgrid system design. Three objectives
are considered, introducing a three-dimensional objective func-
tion space2. The first objective is to maximize the overall net
value derived from consuming power at microgrids, i.e., the
utility maximization for the microgrids. The second objective
is to maximize net revenue derived from providing power at
the power grid, i.e., the utility maximization for the power grid.
Finally, to secure the emergency operation, the third objective
is to maximize a sum of the stored energy levels within the
multi-microgrid network, corresponding to maximizing the
interest of the ISO. The consideration of the third objective
in our formulation addresses the first drawback mentioned
previously.
The proposed multiobjective approach leads to solving an
MOP. Since multiple objectives are involved, Pareto domina-
tion is adopted. A multiobjective immune algorithm (MOIA)
is developed to solve the problem by searching for feasible
points in the decision variable space that represent prices and
the amount of power distributed to microgrids. During the
solving process, dominated or infeasible points are gradually
removed. In other words, nondominated and feasible points
are maintained, yielding a set of approximated Pareto optimal
solutions at the end of the process. Each solution associates
with an approximated Pareto optimal design. The whole set
corresponds to an approximated Pareto front (APF). The APF
is of importance because it can clearly illustrate how one
objective affects the others, which cannot be achieved when
an SOP is formulated and solved for utility maximization. The
ability to produce the APF addresses the second drawback.
Based on the APF, a design for the DNO and MO that
does not favor a particular participant can be derived. In our
1In general, to avoid favoring a particular participant, the weighting
coefficients used in the aggregate function can be set equal to each other
and normalized objective functions can be used. However, such a method is
invalid when the MOP in which the objectives form the aggregate function
of participants has a nonconvex Pareto front (PF). Even if the PF is convex,
other difficulties can be introduced by using aggregate functions derived from
different weights to approximate the PF, as discussed in the references.
2We use the terms decision variable space and objective function space to
describe the domain and codomain, respectively, of the vector-valued objective
function consisting of the three scalar-valued objective functions.
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Fig. 1. System operation model of a network of microgrids.
framework, if a vector on the APF has an entry with an
extreme value, then the associated design favors one particular
participant. To achieve a fair design, we fully explore the
obtained APF: An optimization process is performed over
the improvement of the associated objective function values
in three dimensions. The vector on the APF that maximizes
the minimum value of the normalized improvement in all
dimensions is selected. The associated solution is then used to
characterize the design. The exploration of the APF that leads
to a fair design addresses the third drawback.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as fol-
lows. The proposed methodology for multi-microgrid system
designs can avoid the drawbacks introduced by using aggre-
gate functions. To the best of our knowledge, in recent litera-
tures related to the multi-microgrid system design, few efforts
have been devoted to addressing a multiobjective approach
for price generation and power distribution. We thus propose
a multiobjective formulation, which can provide a framework
for future exploration of multiobjective methodology in related
fields. As the formulation leads to solving an MOP, we develop
an MOIA so that an APF can be produced. Finally, we devise
a simple method that can yield a fair multi-microgrid system
design based on the APF obtained.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the network components. In Section III, a multiob-
jective formulation is proposed, leading to an MOP, and related
analysis is performed. In Section IV, an algorithm that can
solve the MOP is developed. Simulation results are presented
in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This section describes the system operation model of a net-
work of N microgrids in Fig. 1. Without loss of generality, we
assume that there is no power exchange between microgrids
because if some microgrids are connected with links and can
3TABLE I
SYMBOLS
Symbol Description
N the number of microgrids
N the set of microgrid indices, i.e., N = {1, 2, ...,N}
Ns the number of microgrids that have a local energy
storage system
Ns the index set for the microgrids that have a local
energy storage system (we assume Ns = {1, 2, ...,Ns})
k time index
sn(k) stored energy level of nth microgrid at time k
s¯n and sn maximum storage capacity and secure energy level for
emergency operation, respectively (s¯n ≥ sn(k) ≥ sn > 0)
∆sn maximum rate of storage charging and discharging
(|sn(k + 1) − sn(k)| ≤ ∆sn)
vn(k) power supply from nondispatchable RESs to nth microgrid
at time k
pgn (k) power distribution between the power grid and the nth
microgrid at time k
pg(k) total power distribution, i.e., pg(k) =
∑N
n=1 pgn (k)
pdn (k) power demand of the nth microgrid at time k
λ(k) market price at time k
Ug(·) utility function of the power grid
Ud(·) utility function of microgrids
Uc(·) constraint function
[·]i the ith entry of a vector
:= assignment operator
exchange power, then we simply combine them as one mi-
crogrid. An information and communication technology (ICT)
system has been implemented so that network information,
e.g., the price signal and power demand, can be exchanged
among the microgrids, power grid, and ISO, consisting of the
MO and DNO. In this study, we consider a high-level multi-
microgrid system design. Because the balance of current and
voltage is managed at a lower level, the associated balance
equations are not explicitly shown in the following discussions.
For clarity, the section is divided into three subsections, and
Table I summarizes the notation used throughout this paper.
Sections II-A, II-B, and II-C describe mathematical models
of the microgrids, power grid, and ISO, respectively. The
respective utility maximization problem is examined.
A. Microgrids
Let N = {1, 2, ..., N} be the set of microgrid indices and
Ns be the index set for the microgrids that have a local energy
storage system. Without loss of generality, we assume Ns =
{1, 2, ..., Ns} where Ns ≤ N . Referring to Fig. 1, we let
pgn(k) denote the power transmission between the power grid
and microgrid n. If pgn(k) > 0, then microgrid n receives
power from the power grid; otherwise, microgrid n sells power
to the grid.
If n ∈ N \Ns, i.e., microgrid n does not possess an energy
storage system, then we have
pgn(k)− pdn(k) + vn(k) = 0 (1)
where pdn(k) > 0 represents the power demand, and vn(k) >
0 represents the power generated from the RESs, such as
solar panels or wind turbines. In our model, we consider
microgrids that have only nondispatchable RES penetration
(without dispatchable DG units).
If n ∈ Ns, then sn(k) denotes the stored energy at
microgrid n and satisfies
0 ≤ sn(k) ≤ s¯n (2)
where s¯n represents the maximum storage capacity. The maxi-
mum capacity is determined by the media used to store energy.
For instance, if batteries are used to construct the energy
storage system, then the maximum capacity may depend on
the chemicals in the batteries and the size of the batteries. The
dynamics of the energy storage system can be expressed as
sn(k + 1) = sn(k) + pgn(k)− pdn(k) + vn(k). (3)
The associated limits on the rate of charging and discharging
can be modeled as
|sn(k + 1)− sn(k)| ≤ ∆sn. (4)
In grid operation, we consider shiftable loads [8], [29] and
model the power demand pdn(k) in (1) and (3) as
pdn(k) = fdn(λ(k), bn(k)) (5)
where bn(k) > 0 represents a nominal value of the base load.
Since in practice base loads have little elasticity, high-accuracy
load forecasting can be attained and we thus assume bn(k)
in (5) is a known quantity.
To maximize the overall utility of microgrids, we consider
max
λ(k)
Ud(pd1(k), . . . , pdN (k), λ(k)) (6)
where the utility function Ud(·) in (6) represents the net value
derived from consuming power pdn(k), n = 1, 2, . . . , N, when
the price is λ(k).
B. Power Grid
Let pgn(k) be the power distributed between the power grid
and microgrid n, and denote
pg(k) =
N∑
n=1
pgn(k). (7)
Let Ug(pg(k), λ(k)) denote the utility function of the power
grid. To maximize the interest of the power grid, we consider
max
pgn (k),λ(k)
Ug(pg(k), λ(k)). (8)
The utility function Ug(·) in (8) is interpreted as the net value
derived from pg(k) when the price is λ(k).
C. ISO
Eastern U.S. ISOs such as New York ISO and PJM Intercon-
nection provide emergency demand response programs [30].
To feature those programs in our model, we determine λ(k)
and pgn(k) by solving
max
λ(k),pgn (k)
Ns∑
n=1
sn(k + 1)
subject to sn ≤ sn(k + 1) < s¯n, n = 1, 2, ..., Ns
(9)
4where sn > 0 represents the minimum energy level required
for emergency operation. In (9), maximizing the sum of stored
energy levels aims to store as much energy within the multi-
microgrid network as possible so that a safer secure level can
be achieved.
Remark 1: According to (3), the value of sn(k + 1) de-
pends on the values of pgn(k) and pdn(k), and the value of
pdn(k) further depends on the value of λ(k), as shown in (5).
Therefore, the distributed power pgn(k), n = 1, 2, ..., Ns, and
the price λ(k) are the decision variables in (9).
Remark 2: A scenario related to the model described by
Fig. 1 is discussed as follows. In a few universities of Taiwan,
students who live in dormitories are required to pay their own
electricity bills for the use of washing machines, dryers, air
conditioner, light, etc. At present, a fixed price for electricity is
adopted. If the price can change over time and is transparent
to students, then students may adjust their behavior so that
less/more power is consumed when the price is high/low. In
this case, shiftable load, e.g., running washing machines and
dryers, can be rearranged. A win-win situation can thus be
created: universities can benefit by leveling the load curve,
which reduces costs and energy losses within the campus,
while the students can reduce their expenses.
In the scenario, universities act as an agent who buys
electricity from a power company and then sells it to students
with a time-varying price. A dormitory implemented with
batteries can be regarded as a microgrid, which possesses
certain storage capacity. Some universities of Taiwan already
have solar panels installed on rooftops, which connects micro-
grids with RESs. Most students in Taiwan have smart phones,
providing a foundation for building up the underlying ICT
system. A real-time price for electricity can thus be readily
accessed if desired. Once an advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI) system has been implemented in universities, with the
help of the aforementioned facilities, the office of general
affairs can function as the ISO. (As a matter of fact, Yuan Ze
University in Taiwan already possesses an AMI system [31]. In
the UK, smart meters are being massively rolled out. By 2020,
British homes can start to benefit from smart pricing [32],
[33]. In the US, experimental projects using online feedback
systems to help reduction in demand in dormitories have been
launched [34]–[36].) Therefore, the model is practical and suits
the smart grid environment that involves active participants.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED ANALYSIS
This section presents a multiobjective formulation for the
multi-microgrid system design, leading to an MOP. Related
analysis on the MOP is performed. In our scenario, a real-time
market settlement is considered, and the associated optimiza-
tion is performed hourly. In this setting, the RES output vn(k)
can be forecasted with high accuracy and thus is assumed to
be known during the optimization process.
To address the objectives (6), (8), and (9) simultaneously,
we formulate the multi-microgrid system design problem as
the MOP
min
λ(k)
−Ud(pd1(k), . . . , pdN (k), λ(k))
min
λ(k),pgn (k)
−Ug(pg(k), λ(k))
min
λ(k),pgn (k)
−
Ns∑
n=1
sn(k + 1)
(10)
subject to
|sn(k + 1)− sn(k)| ≤ ∆sn, sn ≤ sn(k + 1) ≤ s¯n, n ∈ Ns
(11)
where
sn(k + 1) = sn(k) + pgn(k)− pdn(k) + vn(k), n ∈ Ns
sn ≤ sn(0) ≤ s¯n, n ∈ Ns
pgn(k)− pdn(k) + vn(k) = 0, n ∈ N \ Ns
pdn(k) = fdn(λ(k), bn(k)) and
pg(k) =
N∑
n=1
pgn(k).
In (10), the decision variables λ(k) and pgn(k), n =
1, 2, . . . , Ns, related to the MO and DNO, respectively, must
be determined. When the dynamic pricing, RESs, and energy
storage system are implemented during the same period, it
is reasonable to consider the implementation costs of the
RESs and the storage system when the price is adjusted
dynamically. However, if they were constructed in different
projects launched in distinct time periods, then those costs
and the dynamic pricing may become less relevant. In our
formulation, we consider the situation in which infrastructures
such as the RESs and energy storage system already exist. We
regard the dynamic pricing as a high-level method for energy
management using the existing infrastructures. The costs of
implementing RESs and storage systems are thus not included
in the objectives of (10).
We interpret the system stability as the feasibility of the
MOP described by (10) and (11) for all k. If the MOP
is feasible, then it is possible to find a price and a way
to distribute power generated from the power grid to the
microgrids in each time slot so that the underlying physical
constraints are satisfied. Under this interpretation, we have the
following result.
Theorem 1: The multi-microgrid system is stable.
Proof: Consider the power distribution pgn(k) =
pdn(k) − vn(k) for all k and all n ∈ N . We thus have
sn(k + 1) = sn(k), n ∈ Ns. Since sn ≤ sn(0) ≤ s¯n, the
conditions in (11) are satisfied. Therefore, regardless of the
value of λ(k) being assigned, λ(k) and pgn(k) = pdn(k) −
vn(k), n = 1, 2, ..., Ns, form a feasible point of the MOP, i.e.,
the multi-microgrid system is stable.
To facilitate the solving process of the MOP described
5by (10) and (11), we introduce an additional function
Uc(p(k)) =
Ns∑
n=1
{
max{|sn(k + 1)− sn(k)| −∆sn, 0}
+max{sn − sn(k + 1), 0}
+max{sn(k + 1)− s¯n, 0}
}
(12)
to replace the constraints in (11), where
p(k) =
[
λ(k) pg1(k) pg2(k) · · · pgNs (k)
]T
. (13)
In (12), Uc(·) is a function of p(k) because the function value
depends on the stored energy levels that are affected by p(k),
as discussed in Remark 1. A point p(k) satisfies the conditions
in (11) if and only if Uc(p(k)) = 0. With the help of (12), we
define the vector-valued function
F (p(k)) =
[
−Ud(p(k)) −Ug(p(k))
−
∑Ns
n=1 sn(k + 1) Uc(p(k))
]T (14)
and introduce Pareto optimality [37], [38] for the ensuing
discussions.
Definition 1 (Pareto dominance): Let [·]i denote the ith
entry of a vector. Consider an MOP with H as the vector-
valued objective function. In the objective function space, a
vector u dominates another vector v (denoted by u  v)
if the condition [u]i ≤ [v]i holds true for all i and at least
one inequality is strict. In the decision variable space, a point
a dominates another point b with respect to H if H(a) 
H(b).
Definition 2 (Pareto optimal solution): A point p in the
decision variable space is a Pareto optimal solution if p is
feasible and there does not exist a feasible point that dominates
it.
Definition 3 (Pareto optimal set and Pareto front):
The set of all Pareto optimal solutions is termed the Pareto
optimal set. The image of the Pareto optimal set through the
objective function H is termed the Pareto front.
The following theorem shows the equivalency of the MOP
described by (10) and (11) and an unconstrained MOP that
has the vector objective function in (14).
Theorem 2: A point p∗(k) is a Pareto optimal solution of
min
p(k)
F (p(k)) (15)
and satisfies the condition Uc(p
∗(k)) = 0 if and only if (“⇔”)
p∗(k) is a Pareto optimal solution of the MOP described
by (10) and (11).
Proof: “⇒” Since p∗(k) satisfies the condi-
tion Uc(p
∗(k)) = 0, p∗(k) is a feasible point of the
MOP described by (10) and (11). Let us denote
F (p(k)) =
[
GT (p(k)) Uc(p(k))
]T
(16)
in (14).
We proceed by contraposition. Suppose that there ex-
ists a feasible point p′ dominating p∗(k) in the MOP de-
scribed by (10) and (11), i.e., G(p′)  G(p∗(k)). Because
Uc(p
∗(k)) = Uc(p
′) = 0, we have F (p′)  F (p∗(k)), which
contradicts the fact that p∗(k) is a Pareto optimal solution
of (15).
“⇐” Since p∗(k) satisfies the conditions in (11), we
have Uc(p
∗(k)) = 0. It suffices to show that p∗(k) is Pareto
optimal in (15). We use contraposition. Suppose that there
exists a point p′ which satisfies the condition Uc(p
′) =
0 and dominates p∗(k), i.e., F (p′)  F (p∗(k)). Since
Uc(p
∗(k)) = Uc(p
′) = 0, we have G(p′)  G(p∗(k)) in
which G is defined in (16). However, this gives contradiction
because p∗(k) is Pareto optimal in the MOP described by (10)
and (11).
Based on Theorem 2, we can solve (15) for a set of Pareto
optimal solutions, and then remove the points p that violate
the condition Uc(p) = 0 to obtain Pareto optimal solutions of
the MOP described by (10) and (11). The remaining work is
to develop an algorithm to solve the MOP in (15), which is
addressed in the next section.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR MULTI-MICROGRID
SYSTEM DESIGN
Artificial immune system (AIS) algorithms have been
proven successful in searching for Pareto optimal solu-
tions [39], [40]. In this section, we adopt their basic structures
to develop our algorithm used to solve (15). The terminology
in an AIS is thus used: a point in the decision variable space
is termed an antibody.
Here is a brief discussion on how the proposed MOIA
works. Our algorithm uses gene operations to preserve the
diversity of antibodies so that the search space can be ex-
plored. During the iteration, dominated antibodies are removed
gradually and thus nondominated antibodies are maintained
in the population. At the end of the iteration, nondominated
antibodies with Uc(p(k)) = 0 serve as the approximation
of Pareto optimal solutions. The solution that maximizes the
minimum improvement (after normalization) in all dimensions
among the approximated Pareto optimal solutions is selected
as the output. Price generation and power distribution are
performed accordingly.
Fig. 2 presents the pseudocode of the proposed algorithm,
which is performed at each k. To shorten our notation, we
omit the time index k when referring to antibodies. The set
A(tc) denotes the current population, and its size is denoted
by |A(tc)|. The Nnom and Nmax represent the nominal and
maximum population sizes, respectively. The tc and tmax
represent the algorithm counter and the maximum iteration
number, respectively. The assignment operator “:=” is used,
e.g., A := B means that we assign a new value B to A.
Detailed discussions on the pseudocode are given as follows.
Step 1: Randomly generate the initial population
A(0) = {p1,p2, ...,pNnom} (17)
where pj is a random vector over [p, p¯]. The lower bound p
and upper bound p¯ can be set using (3) and (4), which will
be illustrated in our simulations.
Steps 2 and 5: Dominated antibodies with respect to F are
removed and nondominated antibodies are kept. In this way,
nondominated vectors F (A(tc)) can gradually approach the
Pareto front as the algorithm counter tc increases.
6Input:
• MOP (15).
• Nnom, Nmax, and tmax.
Step 1) Initialize population A(0) over [p, p¯].
Step 2) Remove dominated antibodies from A(0). Let tc = 0.
While tc ≤ tmax
Step 3) Apply gene operation to A(tc) over [p, p¯].
Step 4) Remove the antibody p that yields the highest
positive value of Uc(p) from A(tc) successively until the
condition
|A(tc)| ≤ Nnom or Uc(p) = 0 ∀p ∈ A(tc)
holds true.
Step 5) Remove dominated antibodies from A(tc).
Step 6) Remove the antibody that yields the least fitness
from A(tc) successively until the condition |A(tc)| ≤
Nnom holds true.
Let A(tc + 1) := A(tc) and tc := tc + 1.
End While
Step 7) Remove antibodies p that yield Uc(p) > 0
from A(tmax).
Output:
• The antibody
p∗ =
[
λ∗ p∗g1 p
∗
g2
· · · p∗gNs
]T
that maximizes the minimum normalized improvement in
all dimensions.
Fig. 2. Pseudocode of the proposed MOIA for the MO and DNO design.
Step 3: Let Np(tc) = |A(tc)|. By applying the gene
operation to the current population
A(tc) = {p1,p2, . . . ,pNp(tc)} (18)
we obtain a set of newly produced antibodies denoted by
C = {p11,p
2
1, . . . ,p
R(tc)−1
1 } ∪ {p
1
2,p
2
2, . . . ,p
R(tc)−1
2 } ∪ . . .
∪ {p1Np(tc),p
2
Np(tc)
, . . . ,p
R(tc)−1
Np(tc)
}
(19)
where
R(tc) = xNmax/Np(tc)y
represents the clonal rate (x·y represents the floor function).
After the gene operation, we let
A(tc) := A(tc) ∪ C.
From (18) to (19), each pi is cloned and then mutates to
p
j
i . The mutant p
j
i is constructed according to
p
j
i = δpi + (1− δ)pi′ (20)
where δ represents a random number from [0, 1] and pi′ is a
random vector over [p, p¯].
Steps 4–6: To maintain a manageable size of the popula-
tion A(tc), we must remove low-quality antibodies. In Step 4,
antibodies that have Uc(p) > 0, i.e., infeasible antibodies for
the MOP described by (10) and (11), are removed from the
population successively. The removing procedure is performed
as follows: If Uc(p1) > Uc(p2) > 0, then p1 is removed first.
The procedure stops when all the antibodies p with Uc(p) > 0
have been removed or the size of the population becomes its
nominal size Nnom. After steps 4 and 5, if |A(tc)| is still
too large, then in Step 6 we adopt the antibody population
updating process proposed in [39] to shrink the size of A(tc).
In [39], antibodies are assigned with smaller fitness values
when the associated objective vectors are in a crowded region
and are not “end” vectors in F (A(tc)).
Step 7: Since infeasible antibodies of the MOP described
by (10) and (11) are not desired and they can be identified
as those p that have Uc(p) > 0, we remove them from the
population A(tmax) in this step.
Output: The solution p∗ is selected according to
p∗ = arg max
p∈A(tmax)
min
j=1,2,3
F¯j − [F (p)]j
F¯j − F j
(21)
where
F¯j = max
p∈A(tmax)
[F (p)]j and F j = min
p∈A(tmax)
[F (p)]j . (22)
The ratio related to index j in (21) can represent the normal-
ized improvement in the jth dimension [41]. The antibody p∗
selected by (21) can be characterized as follows: it maximizes
the minimum improvement in order not to advantage one
particular objective.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we describe numerical simulations that
have been carried out to illustrate our proposed multiobjective
methodology. Suppose that we have N = 3 and Ns = 2, i.e., 3
microgrids in a network and among them, 2 microgrids possess
energy storage systems. Let s¯1 = 250 and s¯2 = 200 (kWh)
be the maximum storage capacity in (2). Let ∆sn = 10%s¯n
be the limits on the rate in (4) for n = 1, 2, and s1 = 125 and
s2 = 100 (kWh) be the secure energy levels in (9).
For the microgrids, the power demand function fdn(·) in (5)
has been set as
fdn(λ(k), bn(k)) = (1 + hn(λ(k)))bn(k) (23)
where
h1(λ(k)) = 0.01λ(k)
2 − 0.12λ(k) + 0.26
h2(λ(k)) = − 0.01λ(k)
2 + 0.13
h3(λ(k)) = − 0.01λ(k)
2 + 0.02λ(k) + 0.08.
(24)
In (24), the values of the functions hn(·) are positive/negative
(in percentage) at a low/high price λ(k). See Fig. 3 for a
graphic illustration of h1. Therefore, the power demand in (23)
increases/decreases by |hn(λ(k))|bn(k) when a low/high price
signal occurs. The curve in Fig. 3 is termed a demand
curve [42], [43] and in practice, it can be constructed using
collected data and the regression analysis. The base load bn(k)
from [31] has been used, shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 3. Graph of h1 in (24).
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Fig. 4. Base load of microgrids bn(k) in our simulations.
For the overall utility of microgrids, we let [22], [23], [44]
Ud(pd1(k), . . . , pdN (k), λ(k))
=
N∑
n=1
(U(pdn(k), ωn)− λ(k)pdn(k))
(25)
where
U(pdn(k), ωn)
=
{
ωnpdn(k)−
α
2 pdn(k)
2, if 0 ≤ pdn(k) ≤
ωn
α
,
ωn
α
, if pdn(k) ≥
ωn
α
.
(26)
The terms U(pdn(k), ωn) and λ(k)pdn(k) in the summation
are interpreted as the value and the cost derived from consum-
ing power pdn(k) at microgrid n, respectively. For the power
grid, the utility function in (8) has been set as [11], [22], [23]
Ug(pg(k), λ(k)) = λ(k)pg(k)−(a(k)pg(k)
2+b(k)pg(k)+c(k))
(27)
where the first and second terms on the right-hand side
represent the value derived from power generation and the
generation cost, respectively. The values of ωn, α, a(k), b(k),
and c(k) in (26) and (27) can be found in [23] and in practice,
they can be obtained by statistical analysis [45]. For the ISO,
the secure energy level sn = s¯n/2 in (9) has been chosen.
The valuesNnom = 80,Nmax = 320, and tmax = 200 have
been used as the inputs to the proposed algorithm presented
in Fig. 2. The bounds p and p¯ have been assigned as follows.
Because there are strong regulations on market pricing in
practice, we suppose that
λ(k) ∈ [λ, λ¯] (28)
with λ = 1.5 and λ¯ = 5.5 to mimic such regulations in the
simulations. Note that for n ∈ Ns, (3) and (4) imply that
pgn(k) ≤ ∆sn + pdn(k)− vn(k) and
pgn(k) ≥ −∆sn + pdn(k)− vn(k).
Based on (24) and (28), we have
hn(λ¯) ≤ hn(λ(k)) ≤ hn(λ)
and, therefore,
pgn(k) ≤ ∆sn + (1 + hn(λ))bn(k)− vn(k) and
pgn(k) ≥ −∆sn + (1 + hn(λ¯))bn(k)− vn(k).
(29)
Referring to (13), (28), and (29), we let
[p]1 = λ, [p]j = −∆sj−1 + (1 + hj−1(λ¯))bj−1(k) − vj−1(k), j = 2, 3,
[p¯]1 = λ¯, [p¯]j = ∆sj−1 + (1 + hj−1(λ))bj−1(k) − vj−1(k), j = 2, 3.
be the bounds for antibody generation at time k.
Fig. 5 presents samples of APFs, illustrating how one
objective affects the others. In our scenario, if a vector on
one APF has an entry that achieves an extreme value, then the
associated design is regarded as being in favor of one particular
participant. To yield a fair design, a nondominated vector
after normalization should be positioned away from extremes
equally in all dimensions. This has been achieved using (21)
to obtain the vectors F (p∗) in Figs. 5 (a)–(c). As a result, all
the vectors lie in the “middle” of the APFs graphically and,
therefore, the proposed multiobjective approach can provide a
reasonable way to produce a fair design to all participants.
Fig. 6 provides an overall view on the relation between
pgn(k), pdn(k) and vn(k). The demand pdn(k) responses to
the changes of pgn(k) and vn(k), and in most cases, pdn(k)
is larger than the supply pgn(k) because of the existence
of vn(k). The distributed power pgn(k) has been adjusted
according to the power input vn(k): pgn(k) increases upon
decreasing vn(k), and decreases when vn(k) increases.
Fig. 7 shows the energy management at each microgrid. As
shown in the proof of Theorem 1, we can keep the stored
energy sn(k) at a constant level if desired. This implies that
when an SOP regarding the interest of the ISO is considered,
the optimal objective value
∑Ns
n=1 s¯n can always be achieved
after a period of time. In our scenario, however, since multiple
objectives were considered, the stored energy levels sn(k)
vibrated in response to the time-varying pgn(k), pdn(k), vn(k),
and λ(k).
Finally, as discussed in [4], the vibration of price plays
an important role in energy management at microgrids. It
can be observed from Fig. 8 that the proposed approach
does yield prominent price vibration. Ideally, when a large
portion of the demand is shiftable and an aggregate utility
function is used, high prices yield peak load shaving and
storage discharging while low prices yield valley load filling
and storage charging [7]. These phenomena are not prominent
in our simulations mainly because only a small portion of
81000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
−400
−350
−300
 
F1
k =12
F2 
F
3
APF
F(p*)
F(p1
* )
F(p2
* )
F(p3
* )
1000
2000
3000
4000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
−450
−400
−350
 
F1
k =24
F2 
F
3
APF
F(p*)
F(p1
* )
F(p2
* )
F(p3
* )
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
−450
−400
−350
 
F1
k =36
F2 
F
3
APF
F(p*)
F(p1
* )
F(p2
* )
F(p3
* )
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. APFs and nondominated vectors F (p∗) sampled at (a) time k = 12; (b) time k = 24; and (c) time k = 36. The p∗j is the point that achieves the
minimum F j defined in (22).
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Fig. 6. Relation between the distributed power pgn (k), power demand pdn(k), and power input vn(k) provided by RESs in (a) microgrid 1, (b) microgrid
2, and (c) microgrid 3.
the demand was assumed to be shiftable and a multiobjective
approach was used. In a multiobjective scenario, for example,
high prices may not yield storage discharging because the ISO
does not consider price values and simply desires high, secure
energy levels.
The multi-microgrid system operated in consideration of
the interests of all participants. Price generation and power
distribution were performed according to the selected Pareto
solutions. As a result, the physical constraints were satisfied
during the operation, and the power demand and stored energy
levels were adjusted properly. The validity of the proposed
multiobjective approach was thus confirmed.
VI. CONCLUSION
A multi-microgrid system design in consideration of inter-
ests of the microgrids, power grid, and ISO has been consid-
ered in this paper. We believe that a fair scheme can promote
active participation, which provides foundation for new and
interactive service in the future grid. To this end, we have
formulated the design problem as an MOP and proposed the
MOIA to solve it, leading to a multiobjective design approach.
This approach maximizes the utilities of the microgrids, power
grid, and ISO simultaneously. Pareto optimal market prices
and power distribution can then be produced for the MO and
DNO, respectively. Our multiobjective approach is general
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Fig. 7. The stored energy levels sn(k) at the microgrids.
and flexible. We have argued that the proposed methodology
can be readily applied to other scenarios with objectives and
constraints different from those considered in this paper. This
is because the proposed MOIA that searches for Pareto optimal
designs is not developed based on particular structures of the
objective and constraint functions.
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Fig. 8. Price signal λ(k) generated from the MO using the proposed
multiobjective approach.
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